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I. INTRODUCTION 
From its discovery in the 1530s to the last half of the 17th century the 
viceroyalty of Perú —and the associated southern Andean región of the Audien-
cia of Charcas— were the dominant economic zone of the Spanish American 
economy, as reflected in mineral exports to Europe and royal treasury receipts. 
But by the 1660s the viceroyalty of Nueva España had begun to challenge 
Peru's leadership and by 1700 it took the lead in both Índices. This shift of 
economic power from the Southern to the Northern Hemisphere of Spaín's 
American empire is, of course, generally accepted in the traditional literature. 
But little attempt has been made to detail the timing or the profound transfor-
mations in the two regional economies which underlay this new balance of 
economic power. In the absence of all other comparable serial statistics for the 
colonial Spanish American economy, I will examine these changes in the late 
17th and 18th century American economy using royal treasury receipts in the 
three crucial colonial economies of Nueva España, Perú and the Audiencia of 
Charcas. 
I have chosen to analyze the annual accounts of royal receipts and expen-
ditures ', of the 48 local royal treasuries {caja real) which went to make up 
these three colonial regions, in the 130 year period 1680 to 1809 .^ I and 
others have already analyzed these complex royal treasury accounts for the 
Spanish empire ', and a formal methodology has been elaborated on how to 
handle most of the problems inherent in these annual income and expenditure 
materials''. Accepting all the limitations associated with these materials, one 
' The complete set of annual accounts for the Andean colonies are reprinted in TePaske and 
Klein (1982b) I (Perú); II (Upper Perú); and those for the cajas of Nueva España in Tepaske and 
Klein (1986, 1988). 
^ Starting earlier than 1680 would have biased the results against Perú since there are major 
cajas such as Arequipa, Cailloma, Cuzco and Huancavelica which are missing annual accounts 
for most of the period up to 1680. Also by the 1680s it seemed as if both México and the An-
dean regions were recovering from the worst effects of the 17th century crisis and still main-
tained their relative positions of importance from earlier in the century. After the political uphea-
vals which began in 1810, the treasury records no longer reflect local economic trends with the 
same accuracy as before. 
' For detailed studies discussing the methodology and applying them to this material see 
Klein (1973), Klein (1983) and most recently Klein (1991). Similarly, one can also consult among 
his several arricies those of TePaske (1982) and TePaske (1985) along with those cited in note 17, 
as well as our joint study on the 17th century crisis cited below. A survey of the work that has 
used this material is found in Klein and Barbier (1988) and most recently in Klein (1993) as well 
as TePaske (1991b). 
'' There were three major problems to resolve with these accounts. The first was to elimínate 
the most obvious instances of double counted funds from the income and expenditures sides of 
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can still very fruitfully use these government generated data to get at long term 
economic trends as well as the relative economic health of each of the col-
onies. Although it would be ideal to deflate all numbers against price índices, 
no such systematic comparable price series exist for the colonial economies of 
the Andean regions and México, thus all figures are given in current monies of 
account'. Equally, since a good part of this discussion is comparative, my con-
clusions will not be substantially revised once such series can be used. 
That Perú was unquestionably Spain's primer colony in the 16th and 17th 
centuries is seen in the fact that between half to two thirds of total govern-
ment silver exports to Spain or its colony in the Philippines, carne firom the 
Peruvian Viceroyalty until the decade of the 1660s (see table 1) *. This dy-
namic growth of the Peruvian royal treasury was based on the extraordinary 
silver production of the mines Potosí in the allied Audiencia of Charcas (or 
Alto Perú/Bolivia). These high andean mines were the single most important 
source of silver in the Western World in the second half of the 16th and early 
17th century, and surpassed any other source of mineral production in 
America. 
But the output of Potosí peaked in the 1590s (at a volume not achieved 
again until the late 19th century), and experienced a secular decline which did 
not end until the 1750s '. Though smaller Andean mines initially compensated 
the ledger. Total revenue in all the tabies and graphs is defined as Gross Income or Expenditure 
less a series of uncoliected income, double counted accounts and cash deposits of one kind or 
another. Thus total income revenues are gross income figures less Existencia del año anterior; De-
pósitos; Deudas para cobrar, and the Keal Hacienda en Común category; while Total Expenditure 
figures aiso exludes depósitos, deudas para cobrar, specie or other government valued paper (papel 
sellado, bulas, etc.), as well as the reales labrados de barras. Secondly, given the missing years for 
many of the accounts, using an average decade estímate insures that the accidental factor of pres-
ervation will not distort the historical record. The use of averages to fill in the missing data tends 
to stress a greater stability in the income and expediture figures than if one were using the pre-
dicted numbers taken from a regression equation. On the other hand, given that the gaps in the 
data were often of several decades in length, generating the missing estimated valúes by using a 
regression equation would bias the accounts more than the use of an averaging equation. Finally, 
the pre-1709 accounts, and most especially those for the last quarter of the 17th century, had to 
be recalculated on a monthly basis (due to their being kept in multi-year formats) so that an an-
nual, and therefore a decade estímate could be calculated. 
' On this question of colonial price series see Klein and Engerman (1992). All figures are 
presented in the standard colonial currency of account, which was pesos a S, or a peso valued at 
8 reales. These colonial pesos were equal to 20 reales de vellón - which was the standard units 
used in metropolitan tax accounts. All pesos ensayados and pesos de oro have been converted 
into pesos a 8. 
*• Both the figures for surplus silver exports and for bullion production come from the royal 
treasury accounts themselves. The total bullion figures have been generated by TePaske fi-om the 
mining and minting taxes registered in these accounts. 
' For the output of the Potosí mines, see Bakewell (1975), table I, 92-97; and Sierra (1808/1971). 
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for the declines at Potosí, the long term trend was for Peruvian silver produc-
tion to decline. Total silver output in the Peruvian viceroyalty and the Charcas 
audiencia peaked in the decade of the 1630s. Production thereafter declined 
in a slow but steady manner until the trough of the 1720s. It was only in the 
1790s that combined Andean production finally surpassed the 1630s figure 
(see graph 1). 
TABLE 1 
Estímate of Government Silver Shipped to Spain & Phillipines 
from Perú and México, 1591-1730, (in pesos a 8). 
Decade Remitted from Perú 
To Spain 
from México 
To Philippines 
from México 
Total remissions 
%Peru } México 
1591-99 19,957,476 
1601-09 17,249,406 
1611-19 11,025,487 
1621-29 11,037,808 
1631-39 16,577,813 
1641-49 14,847,713 
1651-59 10,812,749 
1661-69 2,973,745 
1671-79 2,089,103 
1681-89 307,387 
1691-99 432,021 
1701-09 1,658,007 
1711-19 77,411 
1721-29 1,034,400 
1731-39 1,427,272 
1741-49 545,000 
9,333,073 
0,016,003 
6,072,134 
5,782,816 
7,201,026 
2,981,421 
4,333,383 
3,991,220 
9,967,125 
4,770,990 
2,741,057 
5,233,621 
7,811,117 
5,586,811 
8,509,817 
5,325,510 
466,016 
1,174,782 
2,541,652 
3,620,573 
3,672,874 
2,206,810 
1,508,388 
1,379,509 
1,628,439 
1,952,190 
1,661,385 
1,248,873 
1,010,868 
1,339,403 
1,510,826 
1,761,649 
67 
61 
56 
54 
60 
74 
65 
36 
15 
4 
9 
20 
1 
13 
12 
7 
33 
39 
44 
46 
40 
26 
35 
64 
85 
96 
91 
80 
99 
87 
88 
93 
112,052,798 99,657,124 28,684,237 47 53 
SOURCE: TePaske (1983), tables 1 & 2a. 
Mexican bullion production, which had grown slowly in the fírst half of 
the 17th century, in contrast, took off in the 1670s. In this decade its output fi-
nally passed total Andean production, and there began a long term secular 
growth which ended with México producing over three times as much silver 
as the late 18th century Andean industry. 
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GRAPH 1 
Valuéofbullionproduction itiMexico, Perú & UpperPeru, by decade, 1581-1810. 
Millions of pesos a 8 
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SOURCE: TePaske (1987), table 1. 
Total royal revenues followed the path of silver production. The Crown 
saw its tax incomes from the two Andean regions seriously decline in the 
middle decades of the 17th century. This in turn led to a slower but still 
steady decline in surplus government funds generated. But surprisingly, long 
before Andean surpluses fell behind those registered from México, Perú and 
Charcas stopped shipping funds to Europe. Thus as early as the 1660s, long 
before total Mexican revenues surpassed those of the two Perus, México had 
become Spain's dominant generator of surplus tax funds. What had happened 
is that the local American demands on Peruvian resources had suddenly esca-
lated by the second half of the 17th century as dependent zones such as Chile 
and the Río de la Plata had become important regions of Spanish setdement. 
These treasuries were deficitory from the beginning and thus relied on Peru-
vian surpluses to support their setdement. Though the Andean treasuries were 
no longer serious suppliers of revenues to Spain, their role in the maintenance 
of American empire was crucial. 
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México became dominant in government silver exports to Europe by the 
1660s, but it was still the lesser economic zone as measured by total royal tax 
income. But the long term decline in bullion production in the Andes guaran-
teed that this Peruvian dominance would not continué. In fact, the first de-
cade of the 18th century marks the definitive shift in total silver mine produc-
tion and in royal revenue from Perú and Alto Perú to the Viceroyalty of New 
Spain (see graph 2). 
GRAPH2 
Total Royal Income in México and the Two Perus, 1580-1809. 
100% 
75% 
50% 
25% 
1680 1690 1700 1710 1720 1730 1740 1750 1760 1770 1780 1790 1800 
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To analyze the relative economic growth of México and the Andean cen-
ters, it is useful to break down that growth into its component parts. For this 
reason, I have combined the numerous tax categories into a few large group-
ings most closely related to local patterns of production and consumption *. 
These groups consist of taxes on mine production; taxes on local and interna-
* This involved the regrouping of almost 6,000 individual taxes (3,458 income ramos and 
2,456 expenditure ramos) into coherent groups of taxes. A list of the individual taxes which went 
to make up the income tax categories for México can be found in Klein (1985) and Klein (1973), 
pp. 369-400 
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tional trade (to which only Indian consumed goods were exempt); receipts 
from the sale of government monopoly products; and finally the head tax on 
Indian landowners and workers. These taxes explained over 90% of the in-
come received in Charcas, and around half of the taxes in the two viceregal 
centers of Perú and México. 
II. MINING 
The driving forcé behind the economies of both México and the two 
Perus were the silver mines. These provided the bulle of the exports to Europe 
and generated the capital to import European goods. In turn the mining cen-
ters promoted the development of powerful regional markets to supply the 
basic necessities of the miners and their workers. 
Although no detailed breakdown exists for the two Perus of the shares of 
the economy controlled by the various producers and markets, there does 
exist the estímate provided for México by Humboldt at the end of the colo-
nial period. Even at the height of the mining boom of México, Humboldt esti-
mated the annual valué of mining at about 23 million pesos a 8, compared to 
agriculture at 29 million pesos and manufacturing at between 7 and 8 million 
pesos'. Of these three pillars of the economy, agriculture, which employed 
most of the population and accounted for the majority of national output, was 
primarily directed toward internal trade and consumption, with only commer-
cial dyes, some cotton, sugar, spices and condiments being exported to Europe 
(representing an average 20% of exports in peacetime). As for manufactures, 
this too was predominantly oriented to local market consumption, though 
México did export to the rest of the Caribbean such royal monopoly products 
as gunpowder, finished jewelry and minted coins. In contrast, the mining in-
dustry was almost exclusively oriented toward exports, with its output of gold 
and silver accounting for 80% of the valué of exports during any peacetime 
year '". So impressive was these silver exports in terms of quantity and valué, 
that they accounted for 2/3 of total world output, and guaranteed that New 
Spain had a consistently positive balance of trade ". It can be assumed that 
the two zones were roughly similar in the fact that agriculture was more im-
portant in terms of total valué and of workers employed than the mining in-
' Humboldt (1811), III, 265, 347; IV. p. 290. 
1» Humboldt (1811), IV, pp. 362-363. 
" Humboldt(1811), III, p. 346. 
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dustry, and that both were well ahead of manufacturing, which tended to con-
sist of small units concentrated in production for the popular end of the mar-
ket and with little ability to export beyond regional markets. Moreover, in the 
Andes as in México, it was the mining industry which accounted for over 
three-quarters of the valué of exports and paid for the bulk of imports of Eu-
ropean textiles, manufactured goods and comestibles. 
While mining played such a predominant role in international trade, it was 
less important in terms of generating income for royal taxation. Throughout 
most of the 18th century, mining income made up only 20% to 27% of total 
royal revenues. But this was not a consistent pattern, as both in the 1680s and 
in the 1780s and afterwards, its relative importance dropped to half this 
amount. By the last fifth of the 18th century, in fact, taxes on trade, agriculture 
and commerce outdistanced mining in importance for the royal treasury. Evi-
dently the Crown was unwilling to tax this industry too heavily, as studies of 
the Mexican industry showed. Humboldt estimated that the diezmo, cobo and 
minting taxes took only some 15% of the valué of mine output, a figure which 
he claimed was lower than was then the norm for European miners i^ . Garner 
in his studies of individual Zacatecas mines estimated the rate at 12% for taxes 
and another 6% for royal mintage charges ". 
Whereas the Mexican treasury receipts were much influenced by the min-
ing taxes, those of the Peruvian viceroyalty were not a significant factor until 
well into the century. Representing only 1% of royal revenues in the 1680s, 
Lower Peruvian mine taxes grew rather dramatically during the century des-
pite the continued crises of the mercury mines of Huancavelica. The growth of 
Vico y Pasco was impressive and the receipts coUected in other interior mines 
by the Lima treasury also were significant. Thus by the last decades of the cen-
tury mine taxes were ranging from 10% to 16% of total royal receipts, and ap-
proximating the relative weight of such taxes in total Mexican income. Includ-
ing the audiencia of Charcas, shows that mine income —which was always 
a much more significant part of total royal revenues here than elsewhere in 
the empire— did finally recover by the second half of the 18th century (see 
graph 3) '''. That such royal revenues from mining taxes grew despite the hal-
ving of the tax rate early in the 18th century is impressive evidence for the im-
'2 Humboldt(1811), IV, pp. 143-44. 
" Garner (1980), p. 177n. 
'*' These royal mine tax income figures follow closely the estimare provided by TePaske of 
estimated total mine production. The total Peruvian mine production of the two Perus began to 
grow after 1750 and by the 1790s actually surpassed the peak 1630s production figures. For the 
growth of Lower Peruvian mining in this period see Fisher (1977). 
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GRAPH3 
Mine Income in México and the Two Perus, 1680-1809. 
Millions of pesos a 8 
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portance of the small but dynamic element of the Lower Peruvian mining sec-
tor But the fact that Perú and Charcas got tax relief much later than the Vice-
rovaltv of New Spain i', goes a long way to explaining why the combined An-
dean reasuries produced more income from mine taxes until the first decade 
of the 18th century - s o m e four decades after Mexican bulhon production 
had surpassed the Andean output. . , A .• • 
In contrast to the other two zones, mining tax revenues m the Audiencia 
of Charcas were the single most important source of government meóme until 
the last quarter of the 18th century. Accounting for 2/3 of all revenues at the 
end of the 17th century, mine tax revenues continued to account for at east 
40% to 50% of incomes until the 1760s, but then dropped significantly as 
l e r tax incomes began to grow more rapidly^ As with Perú one of the fastest 
^ owing accounts was the tribute income which was to take the lead from 
mTnTng and all other taxes by the last two decades of the century. 
, , 1 fíffh had been reduced to a tenth of the valué of total output in the 
1' Although the royal tmn n „ntury, such relief did not come to the Andean mi-
Mexican mines by the m'^dl^ « " " ^ , 
ners until 1736. Bakewell (1984), II, P. 134. 
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III. TRADE 
The category which most influenced total revenues after mining was taxes 
on trade and commerce. Trade, agricultural and commercial taxes tended to 
grow in quite cióse harmony with total revenues, at least until 1790, for both 
México and the two Perus. But revenues from trade and commerce taxes in 
México already passed the combined total of Charcas and Perú by the 1690s 
and continued to outdistance the two South American colonies for the rest of 
the 18th century. Despite some impressive growth for the Andean colonies in 
the second half of the century, Mexico's growth was even more expressive, so 
that by the decade of the 1780s it's trade revenues annually averaged 4.8 mil-
lion pesos, or over four times as great as the 1 million annual estímate then 
registered for Charcas and Perú combined. Then in the 1790s, as mining tax 
revenues stagnated in México, trade and commercial tax income in that vice-
royalty definitively passed mine taxes and generated 1.2 million pesos more for 
the Crown than did mine income (see graph 4). 
GRAPH4 
Trade income in México and the Two Perus, 1680-1809. 
Millions of pesos a 8 
1680 1690 1700 1710 1720 1730 1740 1750 1760 1770 1780 1790 1800 
decades 
I México íPeru D Charcas —Two Perus 
NOTES: Trade for Charcas is missing for the last two decades. 
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In contrast, trade receipts in Perú had always provided the single largest 
source of government income (or a third of total revenues at its height in the 
1760s), suddenly declinad to last place as a source of revenue among the prin-
cipal components of taxed income in Perú after the wars of empire began to 
seriously disrupt International trade in the 1790s. Thus well before the end of 
the colonial period, Peruvian trade was undergoing a serious crisis, at the 
same time as local mining receipts continued to expand. In contrast to México 
both mining and tribute taxes (in the 1780s) had surpassed trade taxes in im-
portance. 
As for Alto Perú, trade and commerce taxes were a small share of total in-
come but varied little in their relative importance throughout the period (see 
graph 4). Consistently averaging between 5-10% of total revenues, commercial 
and trade tax revenues tended to move in cióse association with total 
revenues. A significant growth in those trade revenues thus occurred at mid 
century and actually doubles from the 1760s to the 1770s. Though Alto Perú 
probably suffered from the crisis in trade which affected Lima in the post 
1790 period, the lack of relevant data from the Potosí materials makes it im-
possible to estímate how the International trade crisis affected royal receipts in 
Charcas. 
IV. MONOPOLY 
Monopoly tax revenues also showed important differences between the 
three colonias. The range of products which were either taxed as monopolies 
or were government products was amazing, going from the standard European 
monopoly items such as stamped official paper and playing cards to cockfights, 
snow and gunpowder. But the most important monopolies in terms of genera-
ting income were the sale of mercury to the silver miners, and liquor and to-
báceo sales to the general public. Though varying from región to región, there 
is little doubt that mercury sales were the single largest generator of income in 
Charcas and México, though less so in Perú. In all regions liquor sales were 
important, and the tobáceo monopoly was of such an importance, that in the 
second half of the 18th century it formed a sepárate monopory with its own 
accounting system independent of the royal treasury. 
The movement of monopoly consumption income in México closely paral-
leled that of gross revenues (see graph 5). There was little growth until the 
1730s, when suddenly such taxes passed the million peso mark. Growth was 
impressive for the rest of the century and ended up at over 5 million pesos per 
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GRAPH 5 
Monopoly Income in México and the Two Perus, 1680-1809. 
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annum by the end of the century, having passed mining taxes in ímportance 
by the 1780s and more or less keeping pace with trade incomes '^ . 
Within each treasury district in New Spain the mix of incomes was quite 
different. Overall traditional estancos accounted for about half of all monopoly 
incomes, mercury about 30% and liquor sales about 20%, though the mix 
would vary considerably between mining and non-mining districts. What is 
most interesting, however, is the steady and almost universal nature of monop-
oly incomes. In all but four of the 23 Mexican treasuries monopoly consump-
tion taxes provided important and steady royal incomes. Thus along with com-
mercial and trade taxes, monopoly consumption taxes were the most widely 
distributed taxes in the viceroyalty. 
"' While I have Usted 6.2 millions pesos as the total average monopoly income per annum in 
the decade of the 1780s for monopoly consumption receipts, this number should be treated with 
caution. Some 1.1 million pesos of this total is accounted for by two exceptional year listings for 
mercury receipts in the port of Veracruz, which in all its history only had such receipts for a 
total of five years, and in the other 3 years was of insignificant amounts. These million totals in 
two years are extraordinary incomes which may in fact be double counted receipts from other 
treasuries. 
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In the Peruvian situation, monopoly taxes grew at a pace consistent with 
total revenues, and on average accounted for 7% of total revenues. Only in. the 
1770s and 1780s did monopoly revenues outpace the growth in total income, 
but then they fell back to an earlier rhythm at the end of the period. As was to 
be expected, the mining centers were important in mercury sales, while Lima 
alone accounted for half of all incomes and participated in all types of monop-
oly revenues. 
In the case of Alto Perú monopoly incomes fell less rapidly than did total 
revenues and thus tended to increase their share of total revenues, rising by 
the 1720s to 25% of total incomes. But then their growth slowed considerably 
as total revenues expanded. In contrast to Peruvian developments, however, 
mercury income in Charcas was overwhelmingly the predominant producer of 
monopoly incomes, and thus mining and monopoly tax revenues tended to 
move closely together, especially in the second half of the 18th century. 
V. TRIBUTE 
Since the tribute taxes on Indian heads of households were relatively 
fixed, being based on initial assessments of the valué of the land held in each 
free Indian community, growth and decline in tribute income tended to reflect 
the natural growth of the Indian population. Thus tax income generated by 
this discriminatory head tax followed very general economic trends which 
were also reflected in population expansión or contraction (see graph 6). 
Unlike the other major taxes so far examined, the tribute tax was much 
more highly concentrated in each of the colonies, since it was exclusively 
linked to a clearly defined rural population living in free communities. By the 
end of the 17th century, for example, the regions in the northern part of the 
Viceroyalty of New Spain were primarily populated with mestizos and landless 
and non-community Indian. They therefore paid little in the way of tribute 
taxes. In contrast the central and southern zones, the oíd core área of the 
Aztec empire, contained the majority of the settled Indian peasant com-
munities and thus provided the bulk of royal tribute monies. 
The surprising sensitivity of the Indian population and its growth to general 
economic trends is well revealed in the high correlation between tribute in-
come and total revenues. Until the 1780s, Indian tribute monies in New Spain 
averaged within a very short range of from 5% to 8% of total income. However, 
the tribute tax proved immune to the crises in International trade and regional 
mine production, and continued to grow until the Hidalgo rebellion of 1810. 
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GRAPH6 
Tribute Income in México, and the Two Perus, 1680-1809. 
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Tribute taxes, were also highly unevenly distributed in the Peruvian situ-
ation. Lima in this case produced on average only 18% of total revenues 
whereas such southem highland centers as Puno and Cuzco accounted for al-
most half of all income. In contrast to all other revenues, tribute income de-
clined less in the initial decades after the 1680s, and though experiencing an 
usual decline in the 1720s, it recovered quickly and then went on to increase 
at a steady pace. So dramatic was this growth that tribute was almost ten times 
greater in the 1790s than in 1680s. By the 1780s it became the single largest 
source of royal revenues —a position it maintained to the end of this period. 
In this as in so many other áreas, Alto Perú foUowed a path similar to that 
of the Peruvian viceroyalty. In contrast to the other two regions, however, trib-
ute revenues were more evenly distributed and were an important aspect of all 
local treasury incomes. Charcas, like Perú, also experienced an unusual and 
sharp drop in tribute revenues in the 1720s —clearly reflecting a pan-Andean 
crisis in the Indian peasant communities— but otherwise experienced rela-
tively steady growth throughout the period. This growth meant that tribute in-
come by the 1790s had even passed mining income and was the audiencia's 
largest single source of govemment income (see graph 6). 
48 
THE GREAT SHIFT: THE RISE OF MÉXICO AND THE DECLINE OF PERÚ 
VI. SPECIAL WAR TAXES AND THE POST-1790 «BOOM» 
The changes in the post-1790 period, especially in total Mexican receipts, 
deserves greater explanation because of its controversial and special nature. 
Most of this growth carne from the previously insignificant tax category of 
loans. In the late 18th century these prestimos rose to prominence in the total 
picture of royal revenues in the viceroyalty of New Spain. Forced and volun-
tary loans and other special emergency taxes were used to support a debt rid-
den and increasingly bankrupt imperial treasury incapable of prosecuting a 
series of late 18th century international wars on the basis of normal tax 
revenues ". With the onset of almost continuous warfare beginning in 1793, 
these special loans and exactions become the single most important source of 
revenues from México, if not from the Andean treasuries, though no zone es-
caped these exactions. Clearly not all of these forced loans were fully col-
lected, but there is little question that they fell heavily on the American popu-
lations. 
For México, these new taxes caused a fundamental shift in the basis of 
royal tax incomes. Production, trade, consumption and tribute revenues which 
had formed the basis of royal income prior to 1780, were replaced by loans 
and new miscellaneous special taxes after that date, as the single largest source 
of income. What the costs of these exploitative taxes on prívate capital accu-
mulation were, is difficult to assess. But in México and Perú they carne at the 
same time as an international trade crisis caused by the war, which blocked off 
traditional incomes and foreign capital investments. This combined with the 
scarcity of mercury imports, meant that mining halted in many Andean and 
Mexican zones even before the outbreak of fighting in the wars of independ-
ence in the first quarter of the 19th century. 
In the case of Perú, some special subsidies and war taxes existed, but 
clearly the economy could not support the type of capital extraction that the 
Crown developed in México. In fact such taxes produced litde revenue and 
such miscellaneous incomes had litde impact in increasing overall revenues. 
For this reason, such basic taxes as those on tribute, monopolies and mining 
income actually increased their relative rates of participation in the last three 
decades of the period. 
" An excellent review of these special taxes, forced loans and patriotic gifts which drained 
capital firom México is found in Marichal (1990). Also see Pérez Herrero (1980). Finally the im-
pact of the international wars and internal early 19th century rebellions on regular fiscal collec-
tions has been examined by TePaske (1991a), and his analysis of the two principal regional cajas 
in the late colonial period is contained in TcPaske (1986). 
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Alto Perú also was not used by the Crown as a source of new funds in the 
post 1780 period. There were the special war taxes and as many new censos as 
could be found in Perú, but like Perú these added only small amounts to the 
income ledger and did not change the relative weight of the other major sour-
ces income. Thus the experience of both Perus would seem to suggest that the 
Crown concentrated all of its special energies on its richest colony and made 
no serious attempt to extract extra resources from its weaker colonial Ameri-
can possessions. 
VIL GENERAL TRENOS IN EXPENDITURES 
A look at the long term movements in expenditures shows two clearly 
defined patterns. The first and most obvious is that total expenditures moved 
closely with total income figures in terms of growth and decline over this 130 
year period. In all regions there was consistently a high and significant correla-
GRAPH 7 
Total Expenditures in México and the Two Perus, 1680-1809. 
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tion between the movement in income and resulting expenditures ^^. Ob-
viously, the Crown spent only what it had and if that income disappeared it 
did not «invent» new incomes or go wildly into déficit financing. Thus when 
income declined drastically, so too did expenditures in quite cióse correlation. 
Secondly, it is evident that expenditures never fell below income growth 
rates in New Spain, though they certainly did so in both Perus. It would ap-
pear that the Crown had more of an expectation of growth or that it was more 
willing to gamble with accumulated debt in New Spain than it was in the 
Perus. This could mean that it really anticipated long term growth in New 
Spain, as opposed to an expectation of long term decline in the Perus. 
Examining the major components of expenditures in the three treasuries 
we find some marked differences. In México and Perú war related expendi-
tures for army and naval affairs were the single most important item of govern-
ament concern (see graph 8). In México such expenses varied considerably but 
GRAPH8 
War Expenditures in México and the Two Perus, 1680-1809. 
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'* AU the correlations I have run between gross income and gross expediture on an annual 
basis —which is how Crown would have perceived its revenues— was both significant and very 
highly correlated - being on average over .95 for all major treasuries. 
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on the whole averaged just under half of all expenditures, going from a low of 
22% in the 1760s to a high of 47% in the 1780s. 
In contrast the essentially interior colony of Alto Perú devoted few of its 
tax resources for local military expenditures. On average it spent only about a 
tenth of its revenues on local military affairs except in the crucial period of the 
Tupac Amaru rebellions, when such expenditures absorbed as much as 48% 
of total expenditures. 
Both Perú and México spent little on administration —Perú being a bit 
more costly with about 15% of its budgetary expenses going in this category 
while México only averaged some 5%. But Alto Perú averaged over 30% for 
such expenses overall, and such administrative costs only began to fall to the 
Mexican levéis in the last quarter of the century. Thus the total level of spend-
ing on administration in the two Perus, was considerably higher than in Méx-
ico (see graph 9). This finding is difficult to explain. México was the more 
populous and richer zone, with as wide an administrative coverage from the 
geographic point of view as the two Perus, yet it expended less total funds in 
absolute terms on administration until the 1750s than either of the other two 
GRAPH 9 
Administration Expenditures in México and the Two Perus, 1680-1809. 
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colonies. Moreover, its administrative expenses only surpassed the combined 
Peruvian costs in the 1790s. Does this mean that the Mexican operation was a 
more efficient one and better administrated than the two Perus? This would 
seem to be the conclusión from examining graph 9. 
The surplus revenues category in all three regions well reflects the varying 
fortunes of the local economy (see graph 10). The ability of New Spain to send 
large sums of specie to Spain and the Philippines throughout the period, con-
trasts sharply with inability of Lima to produce excess revenues after 1750 i^ . 
In contrast, Charcas was able to supply both an important subsidy to Lima 
(not reflected in the figures in graph 10) until the 1710s, which had peaked at 
half a million pesos in the 1680s, as well as maintain a steady supply of excess 
funds for the deficitory operations in the Río de la Plata. These Buenos Aires 
subsidies, known as the situado, tended to reflect the highs and lows of alto-
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GRAPH 10 
Remittances and Subsidies from México and the Two Perus, 1680-1809. 
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" For a survey of the situtuio sent to the Philippines see, Bauzon (1970). 
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peruvian royal income. Thus they dropped to dramatically low levéis in the 
middle decades of the century and then rose again as mining production and 
the general economy boomed at the end of the colonial period. Reaching al-
most 1.7 million pesos in the 1790s, such excess funds shipped from Charcas 
was the single most important source of government revenues for the Buenos 
Aires viceroyalty. 
VIII. CONCLUSIÓN 
Before analyzing the final results of these calculations in royal income and 
expenditures in these three colonias some modest disclaimers are worth not-
ing. The changes in taxation in the 1730s (the incorporation of new categories 
of Indians subject to tribute and the halving of the basic mine tax in the An-
dean colonies) did temporarily genérate new funds beyond the normal growth 
of the economy being taxed. It is also probable that ongoing changes in tax 
procedures such as expansión of the tax base, changes in rates or in exclu-
sions, may have suddenly changed tax receipts in a given local environment ^°. 
But overall receipts —with the exception of the emergency taxes in México at 
the end of the 18th century— followed basic changes in the economy over the 
long period. Also the fact that royal expenditures were so highly correlated 
with income trends meant that the Crown obviously responded in a reason-
ably rational economic way to declines in revenues, by severely reducing ex-
penditures —rather than by any imaginary deficitory financing. 
Accepting then that tax flows did reflect basic changes in the economy, the 
question is what these flows tell us about the history of the Spanish American 
economy in the period 1680-1809. Some very broad patterns are apparent. 
There was obviously a late 17th century period of growth, followed by an early 
18th century period of intense depression ^'. Evidently the Mexican economy 
was only temporary slowed by this crisis, whereas for both Perus it was a crisis 
of such profound proportions that recovery was only modérate (see table 2). It 
would seem that the fundamental decline of Potosí mining put severe strains 
^^  It is quite conceivable, as O'Phelan has recently argued that some of the ¡ncrease in 
royal revenues in the second half of the 18th century may be due to the expansión of the tax 
base itself and the inclusión of Indians and other previously exempt groups. See O'Phelan 
Godoy(1986). 
^' For more details on the 17th century crisis as seen from these fiscal accounts see TePaske 
and Klein (1981), and a «Rejoinder» to the critiques of Israel and Kamen, TePaske and Klein 
(1982a), pp. 157-162, 
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on both Peruvian economies. The further blow of the withdrawal of Alto 
Peruvian funds and their transfer to Buenos Aires —along with an eventual 
political unión in the 1770s, meant that the economy based on Lima and its 
associated zones never really recovered its 17th century position of leadership. 
The recovery of Alto Peruvian mining through government subsidies and re-
covery of new deposits in Oruro and other zones guaranteed that by mid cen-
tury Alto Perú would once again begin to grow at a more than reasonable rate. 
Perú also experienced a late 18th century growth in mining output, but 
together these new developments still did not match the spectacular growth of 
the northern viceroyalty. 
TABLE 2 
Index of Growth of Total Income in Three Regions (1680-89 = 100) 
Decade 
1680-89 
1690-99 
1700-09 
1710-19 
1720-29 
1730-39 
1740-49 
1750-59 
1760-69 
1770-79 
1780-89 
1790-99 
1800-09 
México 
100 
75 
89 
113 
126 
158 
208 
245 
246 
343 
623 
943 
1.335 
Perú 
100 
83 
67 
41 
65 
80 
57 
61 
85 
87 
186 
171 
188 
Charcas 
100 
80 
57 
54 
38 
38 
34 
44 
50 
92 
103 
119 
141 
Two 
Perus 
100 
82 
63 
47 
53 
61 
47 
53 
70 
89 
149 
148 
167 
AllUree 
zones 
100 
79 
75 
78 
88 
107 
123 
144 
153 
209 
373 
524 
719 
SOURCE: TePaske and Klein (1982b; 1986, 1988). 
México in contrast never looked back. It had a small boom in the 1720s to 
1750s period, another pause in the 1760s, though the economy was at a higher 
level of output than in the previous 17th century peak. This mid-18th century 
pause was followed by the greatest period of sustained growth in the economy, 
which probably lasted from the late 1760s until the early 1790s. There then 
seemed to have occurred another levelling of output, if not actual decline, in 
the late 1790s and early 1800s. 
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Tax revenue data also gives us some reasonable ideas about Spanish Royal 
fiscal policy as related to its American colonies. It seems that the Crown tried 
throughout most of the period not to burden the crucial mining sector with 
taxes which would cripple its ability to produce. The big producing zones of 
México had their taxes reduced in the 17th century, while the poorer zones of 
Alto Perú were slow to receive this support. Thus mining taxes were a much 
lower ratio of total revenues in México than they were in Charcas. But once 
the Crown decided to support Alto Peruvian growth, then the relative import-
ance of mine income declined here as well. 
The rapid growth of tribute income in all three colonies was impressive 
and clearly reflected the growth of the Indian peasant population in America, 
which by the late 17th century had finally recovered from the disastrous initial 
shock of contact with hitherto unknown European diseases. But however im-
portant such revenues became in México, they never surpassed the other 
major categories of funds. In the relatively weaker economies of the two Perus, 
however, this regressive tax income by the end of the colonial period became 
the single most important source of government revenue in the two colonies. 
There finally remains in terms of income, the special development within 
México of the new war-related taxes and exactions which produced such 
enormous sums for the royal coffers in the post-1780 period. Why the Crown 
concentrated its efforts exclusively on México would appear to be based on 
the reality of México as the single source of royal «profits» - i.e. remittances of 
specie from the royal treasury. This special taxation creates two problems. The 
first is its effect on the masking of actual economic conditions because of this 
sudden taxation of individual and institutional savings, which was in effect, a 
tax on the local capital market. Thus special higher taxes and loans were tem-
porarily masking what appears to be the beginnings of a cycle of depression. 
This should have negatively affected consumption taxes, which does not seem 
to have been the case. Could this mean that the late 18th century boom cre-
ated enough savings that these new royal taxes on capital did not diminish prí-
vate consumption, even as actual output in mining, trade and agriculture de-
clined? Could this be due to the very strong showing of the economy in the 
1770-1799 period which created a wellspring of demand that even excessive 
taxation could not dampen? From the evidence at hand it is difficult to prove 
the case one way or the other. It is therefore difficult to know if this was a 
suicidal policy of a desperare metropolitan government willing to sacrifice its 
colonies in its concerns for European interests, or was this a sophisticated élite 
which in the crisis of European war was finally and effectively able to tax 
hitherto unexploited capital resources without really destroying the colonial 
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economy upon which it depended. Some support for the latter hypothesis, is 
seen in the fact that the Crown did not attempt such monumental new tax ex-
tractions in either of the other rwo colonies. 
How much did the Crown actually extract from this complex tax structure 
is another interesting finding from these treasury records. There is little ques-
tion that Perú, which had stopped remitting monies to Spain after the 1740s 
was barely holding its own in terms of paying for local government and 
defense from the incomes it received and could afford little beyond this. Alto 
Perú on the other hand, was able to send large quantities of «excess» revenues 
outside its frontiers. Unfortunately for the Crown all of this money had to be 
directed to the maintenance of the new viceroyalty of Buenos Aires, which in 
turn could afford to send no serious quantities of «excess» revenues to Spain. 
Only México could be relied upon to send massive financial support direct to 
the Madrid coffers. From the tax revenue data from Spain as well as these two 
viceroyalties one can in fact get a rough idea of how much money was trans-
ferred from México (the only really surplus producer of revenues in all of 
America) to Spain. The answer is rather a lot. Given the very heavy costs of 
maintaining a defensive fordfied frontier in the north and the Caribbean, of 
subsidizing most of the economies of the Spanish islands 22, and of maintaining 
a major bureaucracy and military presence within the viceroyalty provinces 
themselves, it is amazing just how much the Crown was able to ship home ". 
Thus Humboldt estimated that the Crown in the period from 1796 to 1801 
shipped on average 8 to 9 million pesos per annum in its own ñame to 
Spain 24. While this represented only some 15% of total royal revenues from 
all sources, which in the six year period averaged 56.6 million pesos, this total 
was still impressive. These 8-9 million New Spain pesos of surplus royal 
revenues represented well over a third of the valué of total silver and gold ex-
ports from the viceroyalty, and made up well over 3/4 of Indies income com-
ing to Spain in that period and was then clearly the largest smgle source of 
royal revenues from the New World 2'. 
^^  The so-called situado, or subsidy, to American and Asian provinces cost the v.ceroyalty 
treasury at its máximum some 3.6 million pesos in the 1780s, with 1.8 m.llion of that sum gomg 
toCuba. Humboldt (1811), V,p. 32. , , . . . . r • u .u 
" Some 10.5 million pesos on average went for internal admmistration and defense w.th the 
viceroyalty, Humboldt (1811), V. p. 26. 
21 Humboldt (1811), IV, pp. 451-52. L u u 
" Throughout this essay I have stressed the term «surplus» revenues rather than use the 
term «net» income. Given the non-annual nature of royal expenditures and the complex patten, 
of inter-ramo transfers on the deber side of the ledger, it is d.fficult to see how such an annual 
«net» estímate could be generated despite a recent attempt to do so by Pérez Herrero (1991). 
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Even at the level of gross revenues, the 48.2 million pesos generated by 
the royal treasury of New Spain in the 1790s was impressive by the Crown's 
own standards. From a population of 6 million persons, it represented a per 
capita tax of approximately 8 pesos per person. In the same period, the Crown 
grossed almost 50.2 million pesos from a metropolitan population of 10.5 mil-
lion Spaniards. This meant that the richest colonials were paying over one and 
a half times the 4.8 pesos per capita paid by the inhabitants of the metro-
polis *^. 
The other expenditure patterns show relatively little surprises, especially in 
the light of my earlier studies of the Spanish metropolitan expenditures ^'. As 
in Spain itself, the major category of expenses was that of war, with little left 
over for social overhead expenditures. The actual administration of the colo-
nial govemment was rather a small part of the Crown's expenditures, usually 
representing less than 10% of total expenditures. Thus in the decade of the 
1750s, when war costs absorbed 41% of the combined 16.3 million royal ex-
penditures of the three colonies, administrative costs for these zones was but 
7% 2*. By the 1780s, administrative costs were approximately the same in total 
volume as they were thirty years before. But as expenditures now totalled 39.4 
million pesos for the three colonies, its relative importance declined to but 
4%. The only surprising result here is the consistently lower administrative 
costs of México compared to the other two zones until the very end of the co-
lonial period. War expenditures on the other hand had surpassed even the 
growth in total disbursements, and now accounted for 47% of this larger sum. 
Though shipments of «excess» funds outside America had risen from 1.8 to 2.7 
million in this period, this growth was less than total expenditure increases 
and thus actually declined in relative importance in this period from 11% to 
just 7% of the total for these three colonies. Moreover, even as far as the Mex-
ican surpluses were concerned, over half, or some 7.9 million pesos a 8 were 
spent in America, versus 6.0 million pesos sent to Spain. Of the surplus spent 
in America, some 5 million pesos went for subsidies to help to sustain the 
economies of the Caribbean islands, the frontier provinces along the Pacific 
and Atlantic coasts, and the famous northern mission frontier. 
^^  Barbier and Klein (1981), table 1. For the estímate of metropolitan Spain's population in 
the 1790s, see Nadal (1973), p, 16. 
" Barbier and Klein (1981). 
2* It should be noted, that while administrative cost in the three major colonies were in-
cluded in the administration expenses category, the administration costs for the colonies which 
received subsidies from these three zones, were included in the war expenditures. Thus for 
America as a whole, administrative expenses were probably another 5 % to 10 % higher than the 
averages for the two Perus and México. 
58 
THE GREAT SHIFT: THE RISE OF MÉXICO AND THE DECLINE OF PERÚ 
Finally, it is quite obvious that in America as well as in Spain the Atlantic 
wars of the late 18th and early 19th century were fatal for the economy. The ill 
conceived and poorly financed participation of Spain in these wars, especially 
the two against England, clearly was the major factor ushering in a new crisis in 
the Spanish American economies in the early 19th century, a crisis more severe 
than that of the late 17th century. Moreover this was an economic crisis which 
now affected New Spain as profoundly as it did the two Andean colonies. 
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